The Israel Palestinian Conflict - 4th edition – a review

Our book club organized our review by concentrating on the highlights of most of its 10 chapters. The content was so rich that we only scratched the surface of the past century and a half in that conflicted land.  But with all members attending, we drew out many themes relevant today, and enhanced our understanding of this complicated land.  This review is longer than most, but captures many of these important historical markers.

We began the chapter ‘The Land and its Lure’ with the provocative statement that both Jews and Palestinians have tenuous claim to the land itself.  Israel went missing for 1800 years, and more recently has dedicated great treasure on excavations to establish links back to the House of David, with limited results, at least to the House of David.  Similarly, most Arabs living in current day Israel and the West Bank had restricted land rights for centuries; most land was owned by the Sultan (and before the 800-year Ottoman Empire, other empires), and by collective villages or families (as opposed to individuals). That said, indigenous Arabs have been tilling that land for centuries, possibly predating the Jews.

The second chapter, ‘Cultures of Nationalism’ began with the observation that, for most of history, empires were the accepted social and military structure, with nationalism emerging only in the early 1800s. We were reminded, “Nationalism creates nations, not the other way around“, meaning common language, ethnicity and religion often need to be in place as a predicate to ideas of nationhood.  Jews began returning to the land from Europe in the late 1800s.  They were more inclined to congeal a nationalistic sense than the indigenous Arabs living under Ottoman rule. Palestinian nationalism was however, influenced by the Sultan’s 1858 land code that ended village or family land ownership, changing ownership to individuals  to improve tax collection and identify future imperial soldiers.   This also cultivated the notion of ‘citizenry’, a bonding to the state. Nationalism would come later.  The Zionist’s head start would matter later too.

In the third chapter, ‘Zionism and the Colonization of Palestine’, we learned first about what Zionism actually means, and second, about four distinct periods of mass migration, known as Aliyot (pl) (‘ascensions’).  Zionism at its core means land, land for the Jewish people to call their own.  Since the Second Revolt (against Rome) in a A.D. 72 and the Diaspora, Jews had been distinctive people in foreign lands. Zionism was conceived to provide land where Jews could be safe. With pogroms increasingly common across western Russia and eastern Europe especially, a land of their own became more appealing to those who could move. (Although emigration to the US was many times higher: Move to America where opportunity beckoned, or to a land under the Sultan's thumb?).

The first Aliyah - mass migration - began in the 1880s after Russian pogroms in western Russia and today’s Ukraine, Poland and Hungary known as the Pale. The newly immigrating Russian Jews came in spite of the sultan’s firman (directive) limiting immigration, and these people integrated generally well with existing Arab farmers. The second Aliyah in the early 1900s was characterized by less integration and more Jewish self-sufficiency in working the land.  The third witnessed a changing phase of Zionism with more control of land, more control of labor; using Hebrew as the language of the people, and the development of more kibbutzim, collective farms. (These collectivist kibbutzim were inspiration to the forbears of today’s Labor party). The fourth Aliyah in the roaring 20s came mostly out of Poland; these immigrants had small business backgrounds and became the inspiration of the Likud (conservative) party. Each Aliyah influenced and reflected the social and political forces that characterize modern-day Israel.

In the next chapter, ‘World War I and the Palestine Mandate’, the author states that World War I was the most important event in the modern Middle East. What makes this most defensible was the partitioning of the Middle East by Britain (and France) into today’s national borders, drawn without consultation with or representation from local tribal leaders. (For more on this, read Winston's Folly). Shortly after the partition, the influential Balfour Declaration stated that these itinerant people, the Jews, ought to have some land of their own somewhere, perhaps in Palestine. The result of the winners' post war negotiations was that France got Syria, England got Palestine and Jordan (strategically to hold onto its land bridge to India).

The other repercussion of the Great War was the final dying breath of the “empire” model, the most consequential being the Ottoman Empire which had aligned itself with Germany.  (To the victor go the spoils.)  

The chapter ‘From Nationalism in Palestine to Palestinian Nationalism’ began with Golda Meyers famous comment “There is no such thing as Palestinian.“  And yet, in that period between World War I and World War II these indigenous Arabs found their voice. Unfortunately, they chose to align with greater Syria, but that would not happen under the British protectorate.  Local farmers were also unhappy with more land sales by disengaged urban owners to well-funded Jewish groups.  Other economic changes hurt local people. Things got much worse with the Great Revolt of 1937.

Faced with a broad insurgency and boycott in 1935, Britain responded harshly. One anecdote described British forces coming into a village that was storing flour for distribution to needy local families who were boycotting British goods.  The Brits took all the flour and threw it into the village well.  Palestinian mujahideen were no kinder, demanding guns and money from innocent families throughout the conflict. The Great Revolt was considered the first Nakba (Arabic: catastrophe).  The British reaction would also severely damage Palestinian military capabilities and personnel that would be absent in the 1948 war.

After the war the British had had enough, they wanted out.  Bruising from World War II and with a nearly empty treasury, they yielded the problem to the newly formed United Nations.  The UN granted de jure (legal) recognition, as well as de facto (operational) recognition of a new state: Israel. 

A brief sidebar: we posed the question, were it not for the horrors of the Holocaust freshly imprinted on the minds of post-war leaders, would the UN have granted Israel its own land?  History has a way of pivoting on certain events.  This was one of those.

War ensued, with internal (Palestinian) and external (Lebanese, Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian) forces taking on the Jews.  1.4 million Arabs would not defeat 600,000 Israelis. Most Arab leaders were opportunists looking for land grabs, so coordination was absent and commitment light. Further, three countries, Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan, had just gained their own independence and were not quite prepared for war.  The war was a disaster for indigenous Palestinians: 750,000 Palestinians became stateless, 500 Palestinian villages disappeared forever. Egypt remained at war with Israel till 1979, Jordan until 1994, and Syria and Lebanon remained at war. Active hostilities ended with a United Nations armistice.  Missing in the armistice were solutions or any attention to the refugee problem, a lost opportunity for a chance at future peaceful coexistence.

Chuck related a story when a co-worker and he were driving in Jerusalem when the co-worker pointed to a house that had belonged to his grandfather, until taken from them in 1948; his family still held the key.  This is a common heirloom for Palestinian families.  The draw to the land remains strong, generations later.

In chapter 7, we examined ‘Zionism and Palestinian Nationalism’. The 1939 to 1940 New York World Fair was all about branding, a topic well suited for Bill!  In spite of messaging. neither movement was monolithic, but the two had distinctly different structures: Israel was a democratic government which while pluralistic in composition, is often ultimately divided between Labor and Likud parties. Palestinian governance is more characteristic of autocratic rent seekers in the mold of other Arab autocracies. The latter denies individual agency, including business ownership and economic freedom, such that Israel became more powerful economically, while the West Bank and Gaza remained poor.  The 20 years after 1948 War were characterized by sporadic fighting and incursions, while Nasser was consolidating power in Egypt.

The 1967 Six-Day war was a set-up, The Soviets had passed along to Egypt the false information that Israel was amassing troops on its northern border with Syria.  Based on this misinformation, Egypt, Jordan, and Syria waged a surprise attack against Israel. Within a week, Israel’s Air Force destroyed 90% of the Egyptian Air Force 70% of the Syrian Air Force and almost the entire Jordanian Air Force, while also gaining control of the Sinai peninsula, and the West Bank.  (Note: these became chips in the “land for peace” basis for the Oslo agreements a decade and a half later). In addition, in 1968 the United States began selling Israel phantom fighter jets to ensure air superiority over all its neighbors.  U.S. military tactical assistance surely played a part in the war’s outcome as well.

In 1973 another surprise Arab attack - the Yom Kippur War - was repelled by Israel, but the West paid dearly with oil supply limitations and subsequent price spikes that precipitated the 1970’s ‘stagflation'.  Israel also reduced employment of Palestinians, preferring Asian labor, leaving Palestinians with little economic opportunity in Israel.

Following the 1967 war approximately 200,000 Palestinians moved to trans-Jordan. By 1970 Yasser Arafat and his PLO incited the Jordanian Civil War with Black September. The Jordanian Hashemite family soundly defeated the Palestinians and kicked them out of Jordan. Many went to Lebanon. When they first got there, Beirut was considered the ‘Paris of the Middle East’; the mayor was a Christian (Druze). The Lebanese Civil War has racked Lebanon since, with Hezbollah and rival factions vying for control. We still ask, 'Why won’t other Arab states accept Palestinians as migrants?'  

Two Oslo agreements followed, first in 1993, and again in 1995, and were groundbreaking in that the discussions were between the two parties directly (as opposed to through intermediaries). A letter from Yasser Arafat to Yitzhak Rabin recognized Israel’s right to exist and expressed a rejection of terrorism. The letter from Rabin to Arafat recognized the PLO as the rightful and sole representative to the Palestinian people; it was silent on repatriation, the right of return. 

Palestinian leadership and lack of governance hurt the Palestinian people again. Western governments, including the United States and European countries paid $1 billion per year to the PLO to foster economic development, education and other support for the people. The problem was Arafat and his cronies moved to Tunisia; meanwhile his wife was living on a $100,000 monthly allowance in Paris.  The $3 to $4 billion that Arafat had stashed in a numbered Swiss bank account became inaccessible upon his death. Nobody else knew his account number.

From this point, our discussion left the book’s final chapters to bring it all together in the context of today’s conflict.  We kicked around these thoughts, concepts, arguments and ideas, in no particular order:  

Today’s Palestinian leaders appear to be no less extractive of economic activity or subsidies than Arafat or his predecessors. Ishmail Haniya (head of Hamas) collects a 20% surcharge on goods smuggled from Egypt through tunnels into Gaza. He lives in a variety of five-star hotels in Qatar, always well coifed for his TV interviews.  Yahya Sinwar, the architect of the October 7th savagery is embedded somewhere amongst hostages and other innocents in Gaza while his people suffer and die throughout the strip.  Life is cheap in some places.

Israel’s greatest weakness in the current conflict may be their value of human life. Israel has paid high prices for hostages in the past, and Hamas’ decamping to hospitals, apartments, mosques, and schools creates significant image problems for Israel. War is Hell. This is central to Sinwar's strategy.

We examined the idea that the plight of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza have some similarities to our own indigenous population, defeated culturally, economically, and militarily, now living on reservations.  Similarities end however with the missiles or marauding young men that do not emerge from these American reservations killing and raping innocent people just going about their day.

While the raw numbers of these conflicts are smaller relative to other conflicts (the Iran-Iraq war where a half million died, for example), Jeff pointed out that this war is indeed the front line of a clash of civilizations between rules-based democracies (the West) and extractive autocracies.  Iran has provided extensive training and funding; while China is Iran’s largest trading partner.  China also imports more than half of Russia’s oil.  Proxy wars between great powers will continue to challenge western democracies; Israel’s very existence may hang in the balance.

Many Israelis feel this conflict is fundamentally different from the earlier ones. We know some who are urging their children to obtain separate passports... in case another diaspora is in the wind.  Or Iran finishes developing its nukes. 

Treatment of Palestinians in Israel remains inconsistent and unfair. The roads and walls built during and after the Second Intifada (2000 -2005) were in response to busses and restaurants blowing up. But these prevent indigenous people from getting to work, or doing much else. Chuck’s Palestinian co-worker (with the key to the house) had been harshly treated by border security in spite of traveling with Chuck and holding a U.S. passport.  Prejudice and unfairness go both ways. Today, some in the American Jewish community conflate criticism of Zionism – control of real estate – with antisemitism more broadly.  Nor is this an honest connection.

We asked the question whether American mediation or pressure is useful in reducing the level of violence in this area. On the one hand, United States military support of Israel gives American administrations leverage for Israeli concessions. On the other hand, the United States cannot relate to the problem as local people do.

Reading this book gave us all a better understanding of the depth of the problem but none of us came away thinking this problem is solvable. Any politician on either side that offers concessions to the other is swiftly removed from power: just ask Egypt's former president and Nobel Prize laureate Anwar Sadat.

Toward the end, Chuck relayed a personal story about Yasser Arafat:  His company was negotiating flights from New York to Tel Aviv, and was considering adding flights inland to Detroit for access to the large Palestinian community there. Chuck was meeting with a PLO bigwig for lunch when his counterpart said, would you like to meet Mr. Arafat?  Chuck said sure! When Arafat’s entourage came rolling into the area where Chuck and the PLO fellow were waiting, Arafat stepped out of the car, looked around, got back in the car, and they all took off. Such is the life of a man with a long history of terrorism.  He kept the Swiss account numbers to himself too.